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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
NEWSMEN AND THE TIMES DOCTRINE
HAROLD L. NELSONt
THE FAMOUS DECISION in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan'
was almost eighteen months old in August, 1965 when Justice
Byron R. White told a convention of lawyers that the American public
had not grasped the extent to which the decision permitted criticism of
public officials. The case had held that city officials of Birmingham,
Alabama, could not recover damages for statements made about them in
a New York Times advertisement sponsored by a civil rights group,
unless they could show, that the statement was made with " 'actual
malice" - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."2
Justice White found this to be a major development in the law
of libel, with implications for all who would write about their public
servants. For, while the liar who spread a damaging falsehood about
a public official was still liable for damages, "the honest mistake is pro-
tected by the first amendment whether the reputation of the public
official is damaged or not," 3 he said. In addition, he expressed the hope
that, "cases like this are noticed by more than the public official and the
mass media," including "all others who ought to know."'
Based solely on the many newsmen's answers to my frequently-
posed questions about the New York Times case, I will hazard the
guess that Justice White credited "the mass media" with too much
knowledge of the decision, and the same is true today, three years
after the decision was handed down.5
There has been little, if any, change in the attitude of the vast
majority of reporters toward writing about public officials, or in the
way that they perform this work. There has likewise been little, if
any, change in the way editors instruct their reporters about covering
public officials. By and large, newsmen know vaguely that the New
York Times decision gives them added protection against liability for
libel, but they do not understand why and how.
There are, of course, reasons why this situation may change
somewhat. For one thing, schools of journalism are teaching the new
of" Director, School of Journalism, University of Wisconsin. B.A., University
of Minnesota, 1941, M.A., 1950, Ph.D., 1956.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Id. at 279-80.
3. New York Times, Aug. 8,1965, p. 29, col. 1.
4. Ibid.
5. A scientific sampling of newsmen would assuredly increase the credibility of
this assertion, but perhaps sixty or seventy reporters and editors from all sizes of
newspapers form the basis of my "horseback" guesses.
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doctrine to the students who will become reporters, and are perhaps
making the relatively greater protection in the new malice rule clear
to them. Secondly, as the sequel here will show, the New York Times
rule -is far less complex than the old rule of "fair comment" - rendered
largely or perhaps entirely obsolete by New York Times - and more
susceptible of understanding by non-lawyer newsmen. Finally, those
who write about the law applicable to the press in some professional
publications of the journalism field are gradually explaining the new
rule and publicizing the fact of the new protection.' However, in other
journals of the news world, one may search in vain for any indication
that the New York Times case has smashing implications for the
present and future protection of the press.
While this does not mean that the press is ignoring the business
of understanding a kind of "new dispensation" in the handling of
defamation, there is nothing like the outpouring of print and talk
about this change that there is in certain other spheres of press law.
Using volume as a measure, the glut of print concerning the contro-
versy over free press and fair trial during the last three years, for
example, puts the discussion over the New York Times rule to shame.7
And to date, there is little question -that many editors and most reporters
have no more than a foggy notion of the implications of the New York
Times decision.
There are at least two basic reasons why the field in general
seems little aware of this landmark case and is little involved in its
implications. First, no organized, powerful group - such as the bar
and the bench in the case of the present free press-fair trial confronta-
tion' - is seeking and publicizing new rules and practices which im-
6. Sylvan Meyer of the Gainesville, Georgia, Daily Times has written in Nieman
Reports, "As a result of this decision, an almost unlimited right to criticize public
officials now obtains." Meyer, We Call It Privilege, They Call It Freedom to Smear,
Nieman Reports, Dec. 1965, pp. 9-10. Editor & Publisher articles and reports of new
decisions hint or imply the breadth of the new protection. See Editor & Publisher,
July 11, 1964, p. 12; Nov. 2, 1965, p. 12; April 30, 1966, p. 106; Sept. 24, 1966, p. 28;
Jan. 14, 1967, p. 11. See Yoakam & Farrar, The Times Libel Case and Communica-
tion Law, 1965 JOURNALISM Q. 661-64. A new book of some 400 pages on libel alone
makes the point crystal clear. PHELPS & HAMILTON, LIBEL (1966).
7. Major statements since the Report of the President's Commission on the
Assassination.of President John F. Kennedy (1964) include: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pts. I & II (1965); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1966) ; GILLMOR, FREE PRESS
AND FAIR TRIAL (1966). See generally A Free Press And A Fair Trial - A
Symposium, 11 VILL. L. REV. 677 (1966).
8. See ABA, op. cit. supra note 6; ABA, Report by Special Committee on
Proposed Revision of Canon 35, adopted by the House of Delegates, Feb. 5, 1963;
Bar Association of City of New York, Report of Fair Trial Committee, reported in
New York Times, Jan. 5, 1967, p. 1, col. 7.
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pinge upon news coverage of public officials. The press, as a result, is
under little pressure to examine its practices, air its viewpoint, or defend
itself from attack in the area of libel. Second, where is the journalism
management, owner or editor, that is ready to tell reporters that they
no longer have to worry as much as formerly about getting their facts
straight? That with the New York Times doctrine in effect, they can
ease up on the verification of facts, because only "reckless disregard"
of falsity will get them in trouble when reporting public officials
or figures?
Nor has the Supreme Court seemed anxious, in the New York
Times case, or in subsequent decisions that use or extend the doctrine,
to criticize the press or rap its knuckles for its actions,9 as it has done
in reversing convictions in cases involving pre-trial publicity.1" Thus
no major source of authority has 'been holding the press up to censure
for libeling public officials, as has been done for interfering with justice
through prejudicial publicity.
What newspaper editor, publisher or lawyer knows what the courts
mean by "reckless disregard" of truth and falsity? This requisite for
recovery has been found in only one reported case under the New York
Times rule," and there is as yet no easily ascertained rule of thumb or
guideline for reasonable speculation as to where permissible "negli-
gence" ends and punishable "recklessness" begins.
It is true that one view of malice, among the numerous definitions
during the pre-New York Times decades, has encompassed the idea of
"reckless disregard for .the rights" of others. 2 However, no satisfactory
guidelines were developed for the determination of the content of
"recklessness" at that time, and as a result no reasonably clear precedent
is available to us from the past as a guide under the new Supreme Court
rule.
Since the New York Times case, however, a few highly varied fact
situations have become available to us as preliminary indications of
the type of falsity or error that the court might view as less than "reck-
less disregard." The newsman can see that an advertising man's failure
to take an elevator up a flight to the morgue to verify the facts of an
advertisement full of personal charges was not "reckless disregard.""
9. But see note 17 infra and accompanying text.
10. Major decisions overturning convictions on the basis of an interference with
a fair trial, caused by publicity, include: Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Ridean v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
11. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).
12. See THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF TH4 PREss 275, 307, 308 (4th ed. 1963).
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The basis for this suit was several errors in the famous
advertisement, "Heed Their Rising Voices," which detailed the plight of Negroes in
[VOL. 12 : p. 725
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Similarly, it can be seen that a federal circuit court had a wealth of
reasons for refusing to find "recklessness" in a newspaper's failure to
check damaging personal charges made by a syndicated columnist
against a public official in Washington Post Co. v. Keogh.'4  But on
the other hand, he sees from Time, Inc. v. Hill1 5 that a jury might find
Birmingham, Alabama. Police did not "ring" the college campus; Martin Luther King
had been arrested only four times, not seven as asserted in the advertisement; students
had sung the national anthem, not "My Country Tis of Thee." Though the files of the
Times' morgue contained clippings that would have indicated to any staff member that
there were several errors in the ad, such a check was not made. According to the
Supreme Court, this did not constitute "recklessness," but was at most negligence.
Id. at 288.
14. See Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Keogh,
a New York Congressman, sued the Post and columnist Drew Pearson for an
alleged libel in two of Pearson's columns printed in the Post. The United States
Court of Appeals held that the charge against Keogh of bribe-splitting, aired by
Pearson and the Post, did not demonstrate the malice of the New York Times rule.
The Post showed no reckless disregard in not verifying Pearson's charge, regardless
of Pearson's reputation for accuracy. To require such checking by the Post would
be to burden it with greater responsibilities of verification than the Supreme Court
required of the New York Times where information available from public articles in
the Times' own files demonstrated the falsity of the allegations. Id. at 972.
Other language in the case seems important for an understanding of the
degree of liberality envisioned by this court as a proper attitude toward the news-
paper's duty to verify syndicated news reports:
Verification of syndicated news reports and columns is a time-consuming
process, a factor especially significant in the newspaper business where news
quickly goes stale, commentary rapidly become irrelevant and commercial oppor-
tunity in the form of advertisements can easily be lost. In many instances con-
siderations of time and distance make verification impossible. Thus the news-
paper is confronted with the choice of publication without verification or suppres-
sion. Verification is also a costly process, and the newspaper business is one in
which economic survival has become a major problem .... We should be hesitant
to impose responsibilities upon newspapers which can be met only through costly
procedures or through self-censorship designed to avoid risks of publishing
controversial material. The costliness of this process would especially deter less
established publishers from taking chances and, since columns such as Pearson's
are highly popular attractions, competition with publishers who can afford to
verify or to litigate, would become even more difficult. It is highly unlikely,
moreover, that the form of journalism engaged in by Pearson and other columnists
could survive in the face of a rule requiring verification to negate recklessness.
Pearson and his fellow columnists seek and often uncover the sensational, relying
upon educated instinct, wide knowledge and confidential tips. Verification would
be certain to dry up much of the stream of information that finds its way into
their hands. Whether or not this would please a number of us is irrelevant.
What matters is that a rule requiring certification in the absence of evidence that
the publisher had good reason to suspect falsity would curtail substantially a
protected form of speech. Id. at 972-73.
15. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). This was the first privacy case in which the New York
Times rule was used. This suit was based on a magazine story about a new play
depicting a family held hostage by escaped convicts. The magazine, Life, stated that
the play re-enacted the true experience of the Hill family, and was inspired by it. Hill
charged the magazine with representing in words and pictures that he and his family
were mistreated and suffered violence, when, in fact, they were not harmed or molested,
and that Life falsely reported that the play portrayed the Hills' experience. The lower
court awarded damages, relying on precedents other than the New York Times decision.
But the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, saying that it must
be decided in the light of the New York Times rule. However, the Court did hold
that it was possible for a jury to find that Life knew the truth or was reckless of
the truth on facts such as these: The Life editor's story file contained news clippings
revealing the nonviolent character of the Hills' experience, and a clipping in which
the author of the play said that it was based on various incidents in several cities.
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"recklessness" in an editor's failure to alter an incorrect statement on
the basis of facts in a "story file" within his possession.
Finally, two new Supreme Court decisions add some light. In one,
a unanimous Court reversed a libel judgment of $500,000 granted to
former Major General Edwin A. Walker who had sued the Associated
Press for statements in a story relating to his part in a riot at the
University of Mississippi in 1962.16 The story said that Walker had
"led a charge" of students against federal marshals as the students
protested the admission of James H. Meredith, a Negro, to the Uni-
versity, and that Walker "assumed command" of rioters. This Texas
case was one of fifteen that Walker brought as a result of the Associated
Press dispatch, asking a total of more than $30 million in damages.
The other decision upheld a judgment of $460,000 awarded to
Wallace Butts, former athletic director of the University of Georgia,
against Curtis Publishing Company." The Curtis magazine, Saturday
Evening Post, had accused Butts of giving his school's football secrets
to Paul Bryant, coach of the University of Alabama, before a game
between the schools in 1962. The story was based on the statement
of one George Burnett, who told the Post that he had overheard, by
accident, a telephone conversation in which the secrets were passed. The
decision to affirm was by a five ,to four vote.
Justice Harlan said in the majority opinion in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts that the Post engaged in "highly unreasonable conduct
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers"18 in its
handling of the story. Such recklessness, the Court apparently felt,
emerged in this fasion: "[Even though] the Butts story was in no
sense hot news," said Justice Harlan, "Elementary precautions were...
ignored"19 by the magazine in preparing the story. The Post knew
that Burnett had been convicted and placed on probation for writing
two bad checks, but,
[the Post] proceeded to publish the story on the basis of his affi-
davit without substantial independent support. Burnett's notes
were not even viewed -by any of the magazine's personnel prior to
publication. [Furthermore] no attempt was made to screen the
films of the game to see if Burnett's information was accurate, and
no attempt was made to find out whether Alabama had adjusted
its plans after the alleged divulgence of information."°
16. Associated Press v. Walker, 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).
18. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975, 1993 (1967).
19. Id. at 1992.
20. Id. at 1993.
[VOL. 12: p. 725
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In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Warren said that the magazine used
"slipshod and sketchy investigatory techniques"21 in preparing the
article.
A summary of the operative facts leading to the finding of "reck-
less disregard" in the Butts case would include:
a) Elementary precautions in news handling were ignored,
and the investigation by the magazine was slipshod;
b) A witness of questionable character was relied upon by
the Post as its chief source of information;
c) Corroboration of the witness's statements did not extend
even to the Post's examining his written notes, or to a
reasonable effort to check other sources or subsequent
events that might have shed light on the matter.
The Court contrasted the "recklessness" in the Butts case with the
Associated Press's wire story in Associated Press v. Walker.22 In
Walker, the campus rioting was "hot news" that had to be written
quickly, and there was not "the slightest hint of a severe departure
from accepted publishing standards."23
Does any line of analysis emerge from the above five cases that
might help newsmen more rationally estimate the measurement of a
"reckless disregard of falsity" in performing their work? Two facets or
dimensions of the news stories involved seem to promise a start: the
credibility of the news source, and the extent of investigation by the
news medium.
1. Source credibility. In Butts the Court found "recklessness"
based in par.t on the fact that Burnett, the Post's source of information,
had once been convicted of writing bad checks. Yet in Keogh, the court
of appeals said that whatever the reputation of columnist Drew Pearson,
printing his charges without verification by the newspaper would not
indicate reckless disregard. This ostensible contradiction is considerably
modified by the latter court's elaboration of the circumstances of the
Pearson publication, for "hot news" which arrives from afar by wire
is very hard for a newspaper to check if it is to print before staleness
sets in.
2. Verification of the offensive statement. In three cases the
courts have called attention to the demands of timeliness in getting
news into print. Where breaking stories ("hot news") are involved,
21. Id. at 1999 (concurring opinion).
22. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975 (1967).
23. Id. at 1993.
SUMMER 1967]
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verification 'by the news medium seems to be less demanded by the
courts than where less urgent information (sometimes called "time
copy") is involved. This point was made in connection with the syndi-
cated wire copy of Drew Pearson ("considerations of time and distance
make verification impossible") ; the Associated Press reporter's story
of rioting ("hot news" that had to be reported quickly) ; and the Post's
story of Butt's conversation (by no means "hot news," and thus news
that should have been checked out).
As timeliness modifies the verification requirements, the courts also
seem to say that convenience or proximity to corroborating or refuting
evidence also can have some bearing. In New York Times, the failure of
an advertising man to go up one story to check the morgue on the facts
of an advertisement containing personal charges - charges that would
have been refuted in part, at least, by clippings in the morgue - was
not reckless disregard. And in Keogh, the syndicated columnist's
remoteness from the newspaper that printed the column, and his inac-
cessibility to the newspaper, made verification impossible if the column
was to be fresh when it reached readers. There was no reckless disre-
gard here. In Hill, however, the Supreme Court ruled that an editor's
failure to discover an incorrect statement by the use of facts in a story
file within his possession presented a question for the jury.
One fairly clear point does emerge from an analysis of the
decisions. The Walker and Keogh cases indicate that reporters and
editors are apparently justified in going into print with breaking, "hot
news," or news that will lose its value if delayed a few hours, even
though thorough verification is not undertaken. However, the Butts
and New York Times cases tell us that where there seems to be little
need for immediate publication, failure to verify may (Butts) or may
not (New York Times) constitute reckless disregard for falsity. On
the whole, the newsman must sense from these cases that the decisions
are strengthening his position, even if the specifics of "reckless disre-
gard" must await development.
MALICE, OLD AND NEW
The reporter can hope that as more fact situations emerge in
future decisions, rules of thumb can be fashioned which will help him
to understand the meaning of "reckless disregard." That may take a
good deal of time, and the guidelines that are worked out may be only
very vague indications to the newsman about what is "safe." Never-
theless, his problem of understanding what "reckless disregard" means
in the definition of malice, is apparently a mild one compared to the
[VOL. 12 : p. 725
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problem presented by the pre-New York Times rules on actual malice,
which included perhaps a dozen definitions. Compare his present
problem of comprehending "reckless disregard" - he should have little
difficulty in understanding the "knowledge" element of the New York
Times rule - with that of many decades before New York Times.
Before 1964, the best rule for the newsman to live by in avoiding
accusations of malice was perhaps this: "Don't write out of spite or
ill-will." These were common synonyms for malice, and told the
reporter or editor something about a frame of mind or approach to his
work that would serve him well. But it was only a beginning in an
area that was never clarified for the reporter in the standard texts
on the subject.24
To list the many definitions of malice, or sometimes merely hints,
which the courts developed, would take several pages. A wide-sweeping
definition in British law was that malice meant "a wrong feeling in a
man's mind."25 Synonyms for malice in the cases involving defamation
and privilege included ill-will, indirect and wicked motive, hatred, spite,
personal animosity, and intent to injure.20 Sometimes "good faith"
seemed to be equated with lack of maliceY.2  Lack of malice was also
sometimes inferred where the court decided that there was an honest
belief in the offending words, or "probable cause" for publishing them."
In a predecessor of the New York Times rule, from the realm of trade
libel, came the holding that malice did not need to be anything like ill-
will, but might be "reckless disregard for the rights of others."2 9 One
court found it in "fabrication" of details for a story."0 Sometimes, vio-
lence or extreme terms in a comment were held to support an inference
of malice and thereby to defeat the defense of fair comment,"1 one court
even saying that "matters of public interest must be discussed temper-
ately." 2 Malice has even been invoked without defining it.33
Under such an opaque and elastic concept, liberal prov.isions for
defenses against libel charges might mean little. California in 1921
24. See, e.g., ARTHUR & CROSMAN, THIE LAW OF NEWSPAPERS (2d ed. 1940);
SIEBERT, THE RicHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF TIlE PRESS (1934); THAYER, op. cit. supra
note 12.
25. Clark v. Molyneux, [1877] 3 Q.B.D. 237, 247.
26. See 26 WORDS & PHRASES 230-37 (1953).
27. See Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 571, 198 Pac. 1, 3 (1921)
Jarman v. Rea, 137 Cal. 339, 350, 70 Pac. 216, 220 (1902).
28. See Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 384, 22 P.2d 569, 571 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1933).
29. See Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235 (1877).
30. See United Press Int'l v. Mobs, 381 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. Ct. Civ.
App. 1964).
31. See Bausewine v. Norristown Herald, Inc., 351 Pa. 634, 41 A.2d 736 (1945).
32. England v. Daily Gazette Co., 104 S.E.2d 306, 316 (W.Va. 1958).
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liberalized its law, adopting the minority position that statements about
public officials in their official capacity did not have to be accurate in
all respects to be immune from successful libel suit. (This, of course,
was roughly the position that the United States Supreme Court was to
take in the New York Times case forty-three years later.) The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's reasoning was that the official conduct of a
public official is "a matter of public concern of which every citizen may
speak in good faith without malice."34 However, with a great diversity
of definitions available, malice was subsequently found 8 about as often
as it was not found." Whether California's adoption of the liberal
rule affording immunity to "false facts" has contributed much protec-
tion to newsmen when the immunity has had to run in tandem with a
protean malice is at least doubtful.
Since the New York Times decision, the liberal rule, which says
that erroneous statements about public officials are within the protection
of the first amendment, has been running in harness with a single,
authoritative definition of malice that may provide stability and com-
parative clarity: The statement about the public acts of the public
official must have been made with actual malice - "that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or 'with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not."
'37
Justices Black and Douglas have both asserted that this definition
means little or nothing in the way of added rigor, and that "reckless
disregard" may be found easily." They may be proven correct, but
there is no question that newsmen will find some relief in confronting
the single horn of "reckless disregard" rather than the Medusa of the
old malice.
THE New York Times RULE AND THE FAIR
COMMENT DOCTRINE
The alleviation of the newsman's difficulties with malice has not been
the only result of the New York Times decision. The new rule also has
apparently delivered the death blow to the old doctrine of "fair com-
34. Id. at 571, 198 Pac. at 3.
35. See Larrick v. Gilloon, 176 Cal. App. 2d 408, 1 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) ; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 332 P.2d 829 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959) ; Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ;
Morcom v. San Francisco Shopping News Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 284, 40 P.2d 940 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935).
36. See Maher v. Devlin, 203 Cal. 270, 263 Pac. 812 (1928) ; Babcock v.
McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 186 P.2d 737 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948);
Taylor v. Lewis, 132 Cal. App. 381, 22 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933) ; Jones v.
Express Publishing Co., 87 Cal. App. 246, 262 Pac. 78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
37. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
38. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1967) (concurring opinion)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (concurring opinion).
746 [VOL. 12 : p. 725
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ment" in libel. That doctrine provided immunity from successful libel
suit for -words commenting on or criticizing the public acts and words
of public officials and candidates, and indeed, of all who offer their
skills and talents for public approval. While the doctrine served as an
important protection, it nevertheless had serious shortcomings from the
viewpoint of the press.
One of its shortcomings lay in its confounding specifics, which
almost defied understanding for many newsmen - who, after all, might
be presumed to need to understand. They could find in "fair comment"
much confirmation for Dean Prosser's statement that ". . . there is a
great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense."' "D The
second difficulty in "fair comment" as a protection, from the newsman's
viewpoint, was that in most states it required a degree of accuracy in
the news that working journalists sometimes found difficult to main-
tain. Finally, in the states following the minority rule, which gave
protection in spite of factual inaccuracies about public persons, as well
as in the majority states, there were still difficulties in the slippery
treatment of malice, as indicated above.
The newsman's bewilderment about "fair comment" may be sug-
gested - although by no means delineated or exhausted - by the part
played in the doctrine by the word "fact." Prior to New York Times,
three-fourths of the states that took a position on "fair comment"
began with the restriction that this immunity from liability for libel
existed only with respect to "opinion" and provided no protection for
"misstatement of facts."4 If fact rather than opinion offended, the
defense would have to be truth. And so at the outset, a determina-
tion had to be made about what is fact and what is opinion. Trying
to separate the elements of this philosophical omelette never brought
reliable results, although in individual cases there was often no problem.
In fact, the courts and legal writers made little attempt to unravel the
complex distinctions between fact and opinion as they wove their way
through the fabric of discussion. More characteristic was a simple
declaration, unaccompanied by explanation.
With fact distinguished from opinion, the former had to be
identified as accurate or as misstatement. If it was a damaging mis-
statement, it was unprotected and libel could be found without resorting
to an analysis of any opinion contained in the statement and the subse-
quent "fair comment" test that might protect such opinion. But if
39. PROSSER, TORTS 754 (3d ed. 1964).
40. See generally PHELPS & HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 189-205;
PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 38, at 814-16; THAYER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 453-64;
Titus, Statement of Fact versus Statement of Opinion - A Spurious Debate in Fair
Comment, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1203-06 (1962).
SUMMER 19671
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the factual errors were not libelous, the opinion could nevertheless
be "unfair" and as a result unprotected. A factual basis, moreover,
was a necessary element for the comment-opinion if it were to be
classified as "fair," and this factual basis had to be set forth in the
article if it were not generally known by, or readily available to, the
reader. Finally, most courts held that an imputation of a corrupt or
dishonorable motive by a party from established facts was to be
classified as fact, and not privileged as comment.
As -the reader might surmise, neither courts nor legal writers were
always lucid in descritbing all these threads in the fact and opinion pat-
tern, in distinguishing -them from each other, or in keeping them in
their proper relationships. Text books and reference materials generally
used by newsmen were not in accord in their handling of this matter
or others in "fair comment,"'" and the reporter or editor whose
psychological security needed the support of understanding where the
libel law affected him, was somewhat out of luck.
The New York Times rule that arrived in 1964 simply eliminated
the relevancy of the "fair comment" doctrine where public officials were
the targets of criticism. For all states - those which had given, and
those which had denied, protection for factual error in statements
about public officials - the federal rule now said that "erroneous state-
ment is inevitable in free debate, and . . . -it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need to survive'.. ."" The only unprotected expression under the
new doctrine is that which is malicious and that which is not related
to public life and duties.
Furthermore, this rule apparently is to be applied broadly to private
individuals who willingly take part in public affairs, under the decisions
of June, 1967. The Walker case was a unanimous decision to the effect
that .the freedom of the press guarantee extends to derogatory and false
statements against public figures who are not public officials. Chief
Justice Warren wrote: "Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press to
engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues
and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.' ""
Meanwhile, the New York Times rule has been extended to
another realm of the law of libel: privacy. In two cases that have been
before the United States Supreme Court, the Court held the parties to
41. Cf. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY ch. 8 (3d ed. 1966) ; SIEBERT, op. cit. supra
note 23, at chs. 13, 14; SWINDLER, PROBLEMS op LAW IN JOURNALISM ch. 7 (1955);
THAYER, op. cit. supra note 12, at ch, 11.
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
43. 87 Sup. Ct. 1975, 1996 (1967).
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be "public figures" and subject to the malice requirements of the New
York Times decision. One was James Hill, who was thrust into the
public eye when escaped convicts held him and his family captive in
their home.44 The other was Warren Spahn, the famous baseball
pitcher, who sued for invasion of privacy after a biography allegedly
full of errors was written and published about him.45 Each must in the
trial on remand show knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of
truth on -the part of the writers of the offending works if he is to recover
damages.
With .this growing safety for news media, is there likely to be
a growing carelessness among reporters, editors, and other "gate-
keepers" past whom the news of public affairs moves? Is there likely to
be a cool and calculated employment of untruth by the media, whose
increasingly "savvy" employees may be in a position to take advantage
of the new doctrine and push "reckless disregard" to its furthest dis-
coverable limits?
There are some developments in the newspaper world which
suggest that the New York Times rule should not be viewed with alarm
as a key that will unlock the flood gates of untruth in commentary
about public men. For one thing, competition among newspapers has
declined drastically, and the old need to hit the streets first with half-
documented pieces of sensation in order to boost circulation is far
smaller than it was in 1940 or 1920 or 1900. It is true, however, that
investigative reporting aimed at uncovering public graft or corruption
may find it convenient to have the New York Times rule in effect as
support for a speculative story whose evidence is tentative and whose
aim is a fishing excursion with bait that will tease out informers.
It may be that if an increasing recklessness in the press did tend
to develop, the courts would label it as such and find malice. However,
this -is not a safe guess, for formulas for finding contempt of court
in press reports, and for finding obscenity in books and magazines,
have in recent decades been closely scrutinized in decisions expanding
freedom of expression. Direct government control of speech and press
through court process, has generally diminished since the post-World
War I period in the United States,4" and an expansion of freedom
granted in the 1960's is not likely to be soon retracted.
44. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
45. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 87 Sup. Ct. 1706 (1967). The Supreme Court
vacated the judgment of the lower court for Spahn and remanded the case "for
further consideration in light of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374." See also Pauling
v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87
Sup. Ct. 2097 (1967).
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Finally, it can hardly be doubted that there is a growing sense of
professionalism among the workers in the news world, an attitude of
devotion to an important function and a commitment to performing it
well and in the public interest. Taught in schools and departments of
journalism, and developed on the job, it has been sensed by such
observers as Walter Lippmann, and found in careful studies of news
rooms and of Capitol Hill reporters.47 It will not make angels of news-
men, and we may be thankful for that, but it may help to keep the
New York Times doctrine on the track of furthering essential demo-
cratic debate rather than shunting it into a path of protecting scurrility.
47. See Lippmann, Free Press a Necessity, Not a Privilege, Milwaukee Journal,
June 5, 1967, p. 12, col. 3; McLeod & Hawley, Professionalivation Among News-
men, 1964 JOURNALISM Q. 529-38; Rivers, The Correspondents after 25 Years, 1962
COLUMBIA JOURNALISM Rv. 4-10.
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